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EDITORIAL NOTE
On April 20-21, 1998, Duke University hosted a two-day confer-
ence entitled “National Information Infrastructure Protection in the
21st Century”.  The keynote address, presented by Representative
Porter Goss (R-Fla.) is reproduced here.  While the address has been
reproduced as closely as possible to the original form in which it was
presented, some formatting and grammatical changes were necessary
to assist the reader and provide clarity.
I.  INTRODUCTION
The following discussion addresses current issues surrounding in-
formation technology and national security, first by examining the
newfound complexity of threats facing the United States in a post
cold-war world, and then by reviewing the development of effective
strategies to protect domestic information infrastructure from outside
attack.  While there are many obstacles to an effective defense strat-
egy, the United States must both confront threats posed by a poten-
tial misuse of information technology and harness that technology as
a tool to benefit modern life.
*
 Congressman Goss, Member, United States House of Representatives, is the current
Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee and was selected for the role after serving only
one term on the Committee.  He has also served on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the
House Rules Committee, and the House Ethics Committee.  In addition, he has been active on
the Bipartisan Ethics Reform Task Force and served as a Deputy Republican Whip in the
House of Representatives.  Before his career in politics, Congressman Goss spent two years in
Army Intelligence and a decade as an intelligence officer in the Central Intelligence Agency.
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
A strident national defense policy requires preparation, pro-
activism, and wisdom, all of which should be incorporated into a
strategy that addresses the changing face of challenges to U.S. na-
tional security.  As the nature of these challenges changes, different
weak links develop.  Pearl Harbor, Khobar Towers, and the World
Trade Center serve as reminders of American vulnerabilities.  How-
ever, today’s vulnerabilities differ from those of just a few years ago,
and call for new tactics.
Until recently, national security was a simple strategy designed
to respond to three overt movements: aggression, expansionism, and
territorial imperative.  Earlier in this century, U.S. defense strategy
tackled Prussian militarism and, in the Second World War, Nazism
and Japanese totalitarianism.  As aggressive expansionism led com-
munism to spread around the globe, President Ronald Reagan advo-
cated action in response to the red ink radiating across the world
map.  The United States confronted the communist-generated “hot”
wars in Korea and Vietnam and the quiet war in Afghanistan.  The
red ink representing Communism provided a tangible threat, shaping
a distinct U.S. national security policy.
The period of communist expansionism brought with it the
threat of nuclear war.  The Johnson Administration’s ad campaign
left a vivid impression: a little girl in a field of flowers with a mush-
room cloud in the background.  That image profoundly expressed the
real concerns about the gut-wrenching problem of nuclear war.
President Clinton repeatedly assuages the American people of this
threat, stating that today’s children can sleep without worry because
there are no longer nuclear warheads pointed at them.  Children
would not sleep so soundly if they knew how little time it would take
to re-aim those rockets and prepare them for launching.  The threat
of nuclear war remains, and the end of the Cold War does not signal
the end of a need for strong national security.
A. The Public and National Defense
The United States needs to build a constituency who under-
stands the importance of a strident defense strategy.  Today, due to a
high standard of living and the nature of modern threats to U.S. na-
tional defense, American citizens suffer from apathy about national
security.  For example, recent American military engagements in
countries such as Haiti, Nicaragua, and Panama seem safely removed
from American shores.  The American people have difficulty imag-
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ining the navies of those countries setting sail and threatening U.S.
harbors or borders, making it increasingly difficult for people to rec-
ognize modern problems of national security.  Even more disturbing
than apathy, some Americans have expressed a distrust of govern-
ment.  Joseph Nye of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government has
discussed this phenomenon.  These citizens do not see the role of
government as protective and defensive, but rather as threatening or
dangerous.  The recent incidents in Waco, Ruby Ridge, Texas, and
Oklahoma City demonstrate that modern American society houses
extremely diverse viewpoints on both the current status and the ideal
role of government in the United States.  Whether these phenomena
represent calculated disinterest or apathy, they stem from the failure
of leaders to supply a consistent national defense policy with which
the American people can identify.
B. The Ad Hoc Nature of American Foreign Policy
Today, the U.S. government attempts to allay any public fear of
threats facing national security, while conducting foreign policy on an
ad hoc basis.  The United States has a need for a consistent strategy,
so that the American people can develop a stronger national identity
and better comprehend the changing challenges to it.  There remain
many external threats to U.S. national security for which a consistent
national defense strategy should be devised.  Some examples are the
current situations in Russia, China, Iraq, and Cuba.
Current economic conditions in Russia have caused quality of
life to deteriorate for the Russian people and have created a wide-
spread sense of poverty—even within the former military elite.  This
has placed pressures on the chain of command of the Strategic
Rocket Forces.  Furthermore, the economic situation has also created
a burgeoning market for all kinds of things useful for mischief, such
as suitcase nukes.  Some of the Russian people with whom we are co-
operating on a confidential basis in response to the anti-proliferation
issue seem to be less than honorable in their dealings with us.  In fact,
there is evidence that our partners in negotiation are complicit in the
sale of technology to our enemies.  This is not a comfortable situa-
tion, even if the rockets are not pointed at us.
While President Clinton claims that China has “changed its
cheating ways” when it comes to proliferation technologies, it is im-
possible to overlook China’s long, sordid history as a proliferator.
Perhaps China has improved its ability to deceive the United States,
or perhaps the United States suffers from a dulled perception of the
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threat posed by China.  In either case, the United States must care-
fully track its exports of advanced technologies to China.  For exam-
ple, the United States must carefully weigh the costs and benefits of
domestic businesses entering Chinese nuclear reactor market, an ag-
gressive, competitive field reportedly worth $50 billion.  While U.S.
businesses and trade should not be disadvantaged in any way, it is
necessary to remain wary of China’s track record.  The United States
should not give the Chinese materials that could later provide us with
an unwanted surprise.
Iraq serves as another example of an external threat to U.S. na-
tional security.  Saddam Hussein appears to have no compunction in
using misinformation as a psychological weapon, and he uses it to
amplify or create substantial collateral damage, even where there is
none.  Such information warfare is not fair play, and it would be un-
wise for the United States to mimic these tactics in a quest to desta-
bilize Hussein.  If the United States were to carpet bomb Iraq in its
efforts to sanction Hussein, there would be many innocent victims,
both real and invented by Hussein.  Instead, the United States should
apply the lessons gleaned from its relationship with Cuba.  After a
long history with Cuba, the United States has learned that the origin
of the problems is not the Cubans but Fidel Castro.  Likewise, the
origin of the Iraq problem is not the Iraqis but Saddam Hussein.  To
minimize the costs to innocent victims, the United States should de-
velop a foreign policy that focuses on Saddam Hussein, and avoids
injuring the innocent people of Iraq.
In addition to the troubling areas mentioned above, there are a
number of other transnational threats to American national security.
The United States must update its defense strategy in response to
threats such as terrorism, narcotics, trafficking, and racketeering—
threats that pay little regard to national boundaries.  Unfortunately,
U.S. congressional oversight is tailored to traditional threats and thus
to threats contained within the confines of national sovereignties.  As
the scope of terrorist activity spans beyond these boundaries, Con-
gress’ traditional tools fail to address the problem efficiently.
The United States lacks—and desperately needs to develop—a
coherent strategy for ensuring national security in this new era.  Un-
fortunately, today’s American foreign policy consists of nothing more
than a series of disjointed and ad hoc reactions to external interna-
tional situations.  Although the United States no longer faces the
overt threats of the past, dangers remain, and continue to change
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rapidly.  The United States must define a new model in response to
threats generated by changing technology.
III. ADDRESSING THREATS TO INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE:  THE AMERICAN MODEL
The United States is combating the threat to its technology in-
frastructure with a policy model designed for traditional foreign pol-
icy and national security systems, and now is in danger of suffering an
“electronic Pearl Harbor.”  Because computers are now such an inte-
gral part of American life, the nation is particularly vulnerable to
electronic attack.  American dependency on computers creates vul-
nerabilities ranging from the everyday, such as bank accounting or
Floridian air conditioning, to the life-threatening, such as air traffic
control.  The potential targets are endless.  As with its approach to
traditional national security, the U.S. government’s approach to this
new threat is reactive and ad hoc.  Frankly, we are not prepared.
Recent experience has proven that even the most crucial Ameri-
can military computer systems are not secure.  In 1997, the Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD) responded with Eligible Receiver, an inter-
esting and highly commendable exercise that focused on the
vulnerability of U.S. information infrastructure.  The simulation
team’s operations were restricted by many rules, the most important
of which was that no U.S. laws could be broken.  The team was not
allowed to use any secret or classified tools, thus limiting its tech-
niques to those derived solely from open source research.  No
“insider” information was provided and no “collateral” intelligence
was allowed.  Every element of the attack had to exploit an actual,
real-life vulnerability of the target system.  Although the members of
the Eligible Receiver team operated with their hands tied behind their
backs and were given only three months to complete the exercise,
their findings were dire.
There are many discrepancies between Eligible Receiver and re-
ality.  For example, if Eligible Receiver had been performed by a real
attacker, in order to minimize detection, the hacker would have gone
after systems that were poorly protected, finding much information.
Moreover, the “attacks” represented by Eligible Receiver could result
only in the denial of service, which pales in comparison to the dan-
gers posed by threats such as intelligence collection and data exfiltra-
tion, manipulation, and destruction.  For example, data manipulation
can have life-threatening consequences when applied to air traffic
control.  The danger could not be detected in time.  Finally, a real-life
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adversary could extract a broad range of information from govern-
ment computers, including personal data that could be used to his or
her advantage, particularly in a politically dynamic place like Wash-
ington.
The results of Eligible Receiver were worrisome enough, but the
fact that the simulators were severely limited in the scope of their at-
tack should sound serious warning bells.  The current national deci-
sion-making system is slow and cumbersome; defense and national
information infrastructures are too interdependent and should be
streamlined.  As mentioned above, the system of oversight does not
work when threats are fragmented across national borders.  Moreo-
ver, the current “indications and warnings” process is simply inade-
quate and out of date.  America has entered a horse and buggy into
the Indianapolis 500 of information warfare, and runs the risk of be-
ing run down by more technologically advanced competitors before
reaching halfway around the track.
It is important to build a national awareness that the threat to
the American information infrastructure presents a serious national
security concern.  In February 1998, the issue was called to the pub-
lic’s attention by Solar Sunrise, a real attack on DOD computers.
Two teenage hackers, with the help of an Israeli friend, explored the
DOD computers and exploited the vulnerabilities they found.  This is
not fiction; the attack was real.  Solar Sunrise was well publicized and
completely separate from Eligible Receiver, although it did validate
the findings of the prior study—government systems are vulnerable
to attack.  The more troubling part of the attack was that the media
down-played the severity of the threat.  For example, unknown secu-
rity experts are quoted as saying that, “[t]he tools exist to defend the
sites [if] people wish to defend them.”  Or, “most of the recent at-
tacks have been ‘ankle biters.’  They’re relatively unsophisticated ef-
forts using easily available software that are more a nuisance than a
danger.”  Or, “such ‘security breaches’ generally amount to nothing
more than the equivalent of ‘a kid walking into the Pentagon cafete-
ria.’  If [the hackers] get into the war room, that’s something differ-
ent.”  If these sorts of intrusions go on every day, the United States is
in deep trouble.
IV.  ENCRYPTION
Encryption can serve as a key defensive weapon in the battle to
protect information.  Unfortunately, our strategies are not yet well
implemented, despite the known danger of terrorists, drug traffick-
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ers, and others using encryption for their own interests.
“Uncrackable” encryption is now available, and its possible entry
into the marketplace where criminals have easy access generates le-
gitimate law enforcement and national security concerns.
The division between overseas and domestic law enforcement is
important to the American system of government and has served the
nation well in the past.  However, today’s environment calls for
closer coordination between the intelligence community, with its in-
ternational expertise, and domestic law enforcement.  MI6, the Brit-
ish intelligence agency, provides good reliable information through-
out Britain.  Britain confronts the unrest in Northern Ireland in many
ways, including the intelligent use of good information.  The United
States has been clumsy about building the network between domestic
law enforcement and overseas intelligence.  To deliver good intelli-
gence to American decision makers, the U.S. government needs to
communicate the information better and quicker.
Without the capability of accessing encoded material through
court orders and court sanctions, America will find it harder to fight
the war on drugs, control terrorism, or ferret out racketeering.  The
matter of encryption is now before the U.S. Congress because the in-
formation technology industry collectively approached the appropri-
ate committees asking for the authority to export encryption tech-
nology.
There are two additional components to the encryption debate:
national security and law enforcement.  Congress has recognized that
there are two sides to the debate and asked the administration for a
policy that addresses these security concerns.
Although strides are being made to address encryption issues
domestically, the effort to bring international parties together on the
issue has been stillborn.  The French did not allow encryption for a
long time, but have now begun to liberalize encryption regulation.
The British are involved in much the same debate as the United
States but are leaning toward more government regulation.  Nations
around the world are waiting for the United States to address the is-
sue with a coherent policy.  America needs a key recovery system or
other technological solution.  Whatever the device, it cannot be sub-
ject to abuse, since that would defeat the purpose of encryption pro-
tection.
The encryption question turns on the need for a single world-
wide system, driven by commercial motivations.  Business needs the
benefit of an international network in order to compete.  A large per-
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centage of the business community will support a universal global
policy, provided that the governments of the United States and
Western Europe can get other nations to agree.  Granted, there will
always be freelancers who will strive to come up with a better prod-
uct and peddle it off in the bushes to the mischief-makers.  When le-
gitimate law enforcement or national security purposes are apparent,
and law enforcement is properly authorized to do so, governments
should be able to decode encrypted material.  Checks and balances
could be incorporated in an international network in order to prop-
erly protect those who need protection.
People should not believe that government is able to decode all
encrypted material.  A system can provide the means for third parties
to access plain text information, so that recovery is possible.  If an
uncrackable system is developed and only two people possess the
key, the death of one of the keyholders poses a serious problem.
With information assurance, the United States must address certifica-
tions and authorizations and determine whether the information has
been tampered with.  The encryption piece is the easy piece of the
puzzle.  If the U.S. government cannot resolve the encryption prob-
lem, it will be difficult to deal with the rest of the information di-
lemma.
Encryption has been on the legislative front burner for about
nine months.  The Security and Freedom Through Encryption Act
has many co-sponsors; some sponsors have dropped out, upon real-
izing that encryption involves not just the Commerce and Judiciary
Committees, but also National Security and Intelligence Committees.
If encryption policy is studied carefully, it will be understood that
there is more to the debate than responding to software vendors.
Technological experts must find a way to preserve the protection of
data, yet provide law enforcement with the means to get into plain
text if necessary.  The cause of the problem lies not in technology, but
in ethics.  The horse and buggy is about to be run over by the race
cars.
V.  CONCLUSION
The growing importance of information technology presents not
only new opportunities to benefit modern society, but also brings
challenges to the approach and methodology of securing that society
from outside attack.  The form of threats facing the United States has
changed and continues to do so; legislators and policymakers must
shift their focus and dedicate resources and efforts to ensure that se-
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curity measures are in step with evolving technology.  The United
States must not be the sponsor of the horse and buggy in the Indian-
apolis 500, guaranteed to finish last.
